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STORM AND WASTEWATER INFRASTRUCTURE: NEGOTIATING DISPUTES IN THE FACE OF
COVID AND EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS
By
Shannon Leininger*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most overlooked effects of COVID and the increasing number of
extreme weather events is the detrimental impact on storm and wastewater infrastructure.
These events are compounding onto an already deteriorating system. In 2017, the
American Society for Civil Engineers’ (“ASCE”) Infrastructure Report rated the United
States wastewater infrastructure a D+.1 Currently, there are over 800,000 miles of public
sewage pipes in the United States.2 But to meet current and future demands for
wastewater, $271 billion in funding and 532 new systems are needed.3
Further escalating the wastewater problem are combined sewer overflows (CSOs)
and sewer system overflows (SSOs) which can occur during storms.4 Many
municipalities in the United States use combined sewer systems to collect stormwater
runoff, domestic sewage, and industrial wastewater into one pipe.5 Normally, the water
goes to a treatment plant, but when the system overflows, the untreated water flows
directly into nearby streams, rivers, and other waterbodies.6 These CSOs significantly
impact public health and wildlife in nearly 860 municipalities in the United States.7

* Shannon Leininger is the Admissions & Research Editor on the Arbitration Law Review and a 2022 Juris
Doctor Candidate at Penn State Law.
1. Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs, Wastewater, INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD,
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/cat-item/wastewater/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Urban Water Quality: Sewage Overflows, U.S. GEO. SURVEY, https://www.usgs.gov/specialtopic/water-science-school/science/urban-water-quality-sewage-overflows?qtscience_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
5. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOWS (CSOS) (2020),
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/combined-sewer-overflows-csos; Stormwater Management, PHILLY
WATERSHEDS, http://archive.phillywatersheds.org/watershed_issues/stormwater_management (last visited
Oct. 24, 2020).
6. Id.
7. Id.; Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs, Conditions & Capacity, INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD,
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wastewater/conditions-capacity#stormwater (last visited Oct. 24,
2020).
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Behind non-point source pollution8, CSOs are the leading source of water pollution in the
United States.9 In 2014, 1482 CSO events discharged at least twenty-two billion gallons
of untreated wastewater into the Great Lakes.10
Both waste and stormwater infrastructure are expensive and require continual
maintenance, but the costs are primarily imposed on local governments.11 In 2007, local
governments spent forty-three billion dollars on wastewater infrastructure.12 Local
governments have responded to infrastructure demands by joining larger authorities or
privatizing their storm and wastewater infrastructure.13 But, when infrastructure
improvements or increased maintenance demands water utility rates be raised, disputes
can arise between the government and the authority managing the infrastructure
(“Managing Entity”).
When the disputes are not settled through alternate dispute resolution, the result is
expensive, long litigation with expenses being passed to the taxpayers.14 Litigation
expenses are transferred to the residents either through taxes or by increasing water utility
rates, leading to disparate effects on lower-income ratepayers.15 “In many communities
the lowest twenty percent of earners pay almost one-fifth of their income towards their
8. Non-point source pollution refers to “any source of water pollution that does not meet the legal definition
of ‘point source’” including “storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.” U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT NONPOINT SOURCE (NPS) POLLUTION (last updated
Oct. 7, 2020).
9. Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11 Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs, Funding & Future Need, INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD,
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wastewater/funding-future-need/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
12. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-728, STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON A NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE BANK AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 1 (2010).
13. See generally Regional Stormwater Management: Flood Control at Less Cost, SPOTLIGHT ON
EFFECTIVE PRACTICES (N.J. Future, Trenton, N.J.), Mar. 2019, at 1-2, https://www.njfuture.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/Regional-Solutions-for-Stormwater-Management.pdf (the Wyoming Valley
Sanitation Authority acts as a regional authority for thirty-two municipalities to save money on stormwater
infrastructure projects); Planning for the Region’s Future Sewer Needs, LEHIGH CTY. AUTH.,
https://www.lehighcountyauthority.org/wastewater/sewer-overflows/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) ( the
Lehigh County Authority is a regional sewer system used by fourteen municipalities in the region); Service
Area and Facilities, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST., https://www.neorsd.org/about/service-area-andfacilities/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020) (the Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District maintains wastewater
treatment plants and provides services for over one million residents in multiple cities).
14. See generally Steve Schulwitz, Water-sewer dispute: How did we get here?, THE ALPENA NEWS (Mar.
27, 2019), https://www.thealpenanews.com/news/local-news/2019/03/water-sewer-dispute-how-did-weget-here/ (Alpena City, Michigan has been disputing since 2014 and has spent $1.16 million on attorneys
and other costs associated with the case).
15. See id.
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water bill.”16 In 2014, the average monthly sewer bill ranged from $12.72 in Memphis,
TN to $149.35 in Atlanta, GA.17 Furthermore, arbitrating infrastructure disputes is highly
discouraged because the award generally only solves the present dispute instead of
creating long-term solutions.18 Also, awards often do not reflect the interests of the
multiple parties and stakeholders involved and tend to disfavor the public party.19 Thus,
local governments must negotiate and preserve their relationship with the Managing
Entity to reduce costs to their constituents and protect the local environment.
This article will first address the additional stresses on the system caused by
COVID and extreme weather events and the increasing importance of adaptability in
infrastructure management. This article will then address the Consensus Building
Approach as an effective method to frame negotiations between local governments and
the Managing Entity. Then this article will analyze three different storm and wastewater
management negotiations and compare them to the Consensus Building Approach.
Finally, this article will summarize the key strategies and problems to avoid in finding a
successful resolution in a storm or wastewater management dispute.
II. COVID AND INCREASED EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS’ IMPACTS
STORMWATER INFRASTRUCTURE

ON

WASTE

AND

COVID is wreaking widespread havoc in various sectors across the world
including public health and the economy. However, an overlooked side-effect of COVID
affecting many Americans is COVID’s impact on storm and wastewater infrastructure.
These impacts were caused by improper disposal of personal protection equipment (PPE)
materials and using non-flushable materials as an alternative to toilet paper leading to

16. Wastewater Utilities Eye House Infrastructure Package to Address Priorities, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY
REPORT (Inside Washington Publishers, Arlington, Va.), Feb. 15, 2019.
17. Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs, supra note 11.
18. See Dana Tims, Sewer-Rate Fight between Milwaukie and Clackamas County Heading to Arbitration,
but Long-Term Concerns Remain, THE OREGONIAN (Jan. 10, 2019),
https://www.oregonlive.com/milwaukie/2010/04/sewerrate_fight_between_milwaukie_and_clackamas_county_heading_to_arbitration_but_longterm_concern.html (“the arbitrator’s decision won’t address the far more complex and contentious realities
. . . [the parties] need to better understand why the rate negotiations heading for arbitration dissolved into
such costly, legalistic chaos. If they don’t . . . it probably will crop back up”).
19. See Rui Cunha Marques, Is Arbitration the Right Way to Settle Conflicts in PPP Arrangements?, 34 J.
MGMT. IN ENGINEERING, Jan. 2018, at 1,6 (“Arbitration should not be the first option or an overemphasized
manner of settling disputes, because sometimes it is time-consuming, adds to projects costs, and makes the
environment even more hostile than conventional courts . . . [arbitration] put[s] the public sector in an
unfavorable position . . . experience shows that it can lead to controversial outcomes and be very tiring for
both parties.”).
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sewer clogs, CSOs, and SSOs.20 The damage caused by these non-flushable materials to
storm and wastewater infrastructure is deceivingly expensive. For instance, in
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, employees went from cleaning the pumping stations on a
monthly basis to several times a week.21 At one wastewater pumping station in
Maryland, there was an increase of 37,000 pounds of wipes between January and March
2020 compared to the previous year.22
Operation and maintenance are the most expensive part of managing wastewater
infrastructure. Local governments spend an estimated thirty billion dollars annually on
operation and maintenance compared to twenty billion dollars on capital sewer
expenditures.23 For example, Michigan’s Macomb County spent $50,000 removing a
fatberg – a blockage in the sewer system made of fat, wipes, and other materials – that
was one hundred feet long and eleven feet wide.24 The community has also spent millions
installing screens to catch the thousands of pounds of wipes that flow through every
week.25 Not only are expenses increasing, but the utility industry is also losing an
estimated $12.5 billion in revenue because of COVID.26 The non-residential sector is
using less water due to business closures and the residential sector is increasingly
defaulting on payments due to financial hardship.27
However, the unpredictable expenses are not limited to COVID. According to the
World Meteorological Organization, “[e]xtreme weather and climate events have
increased in frequency, intensity and severity as [a] result of climate change and hit
vulnerable communities disproportionately hard”.28 Extreme rainfall events are expected

20. See Wipes, Masks and Gloves Among PPE Equipment Clogging Sewers, Storm Drains Across the U.S.,
COLUMBIA BROAD. SYS. (June 4, 2020, 6:33 AM), https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2020/06/04/wipes-masksgloves-ppe-clogging-sewers-storm-drains-us/.
21. Claudia Lauer & John Fleshner, Epidemic of Wipes and Masks Plagues Sewers, Storm Drains, AM.
PRESS (June 4, 2020), https://apnews.com/c063f6c45fbe7f7870b61936f77f3d34.
22. Id.
23. Am. Soc’y of Civil Eng’rs, Funding & Future Need, INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD (last visited Oct.
25, 2020).
24. Lauer, supra note 21.
25. Id.
26. Shadi Eskaf, Financial Implications of COVID-19 for Water and Wastewater Utilities, UNIV. OF N.C.
AT CHAPEL HILL (Mar. 26, 2020), http://efc.web.unc.edu/2020/03/26/financial-implications-of-covid-19for-water-and-wastewater-utilities/.
27. E.g., id.
28. Pamela Falk, Dramatic Increase Expected in Fierce Storms and Wildfires, U.N. Agencies Say, CBS
NEWS (Oct. 14, 2020, 6:25 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dramatic-increase-expected-fiercestorms-wildfires-united-nations-state-of-climate-report-2020-10-14/.
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to be twice as common by 2050.29 Storms are already increasing in frequency with the
2020 Atlantic hurricane season having a record-breaking thirty named storms.30 This was
the fifth consecutive year with an above average number of hurricanes.31 Increased
extreme rainfall events are extremely detrimental to storm and wastewater infrastructure.
As water falls faster than the soil can absorb, stormwater runoff increases and eventually
creates CSOs and SSOs.32 These events will likely disparately impact small vulnerable
communities that cannot as easily absorb the extra expenses of operation and
maintenance as larger and more affluent cities can. Therefore, negotiations that can
establish processes to respond to unexpected expenses and risks imposed by these events
are necessary to avoid litigation.
III.

HOW SHOULD LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS?

Several factors make a negotiation successful in infrastructure disputes including
engaging stakeholders, participating in collaborative adaptive management, focusing on
mutual gains, and conducting scenario planning.33 These factors are part of the Consensus
Building Approach and are particularly relevant to storm and wastewater infrastructure
disputes.34 The first factor – engaging stakeholders – is key in infrastructure disputes due
to the effect the resolution will have on the ratepayers in the community. When engaging
stakeholders, one must make sure to represent all groups, and the representatives for
those groups must have apparent legitimacy.35 The outcome will likely increase utility
rates or taxes, directly impacting ratepayers and residents financially. Therefore,
ratepayers and residents will be more willing to embrace the outcome if they feel heard
during the process. Consequently, for infrastructure disputes, it is vital to have the
29. Michelle Albert, Mike Nanos & Jacque-Ann Grant, Can We Incorporate Climate Change Principles
Into Wastewater Infrastructure Design?, WSP (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.wsp.com/en-CA/insights/cacan-we-incorporate-climate-change-principles-into-wastewater-infrastructure-design.
30. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., RECORD-BREAKING ATLANTIC HURRICANE SEASON DRAWS
TO AN END (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.noaa.gov/media-release/record-breaking-atlantic-hurricaneseason-draws-to-end.
31. See id.
32. See NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ASK THE SCIENTIST: EXTREME RAINFALL, WHY IT
HAPPENS AND HOW WE PREDICT IT (2018), https://www.noaa.gov/stories/ask-scientist-extreme-rainfallwhy-it-happens-and-how-we-predict-it.
33. See Tools, MIT SCI. IMPACT COLLAB., https://scienceimpact.mit.edu/tools (last visited Oct. 25, 2020);
see also Lawrence Susskind, Paul F. Levy & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS 36 – 40 (2000).
34. See id.
35. Stakeholder Engagement, MIT SCI. IMPACT COLLAB., https://scienceimpact.mit.edu/stakeholderengagement (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
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ratepayers represented and any other parties with a stake in the dispute. For instance,
including the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) may be necessary since
compliance with the Clean Water Act is a frequent issue in waste and stormwater
infrastructure disputes.36 Effective stakeholder engagement can also help the main
parties consider the underlying interests and values of the community and develop more
innovative solutions.37
Local governments must disseminate information and regularly seek feedback
from their constituencies to enforce public trust and ratepayer acceptance of solutions.38
Another key way to engage stakeholders is to use engagement support tools like websites,
polling, and podcasts.39 If stakeholder engagement is done incorrectly then constituencies
can become frustrated and lose trust in their representatives.40 If enough constituents
protest the agreement, the agreement’s likelihood of ratification is lowered
significantly.41 If the parties have to resort to litigation, the dispute will likely last longer
and be more expensive than if the parties had ratified the negotiated agreement.
Another important factor is for the agreement to incorporate collaborative,
adaptive management practices. The agreement should be adaptable to increasing
impervious surfaces, extreme weather events, and fluctuating populations. Instead of
focusing on how to finance infrastructure and structure rates in the immediate situation,
the focus should be on “institutionalizing ongoing cycles of evaluation and subsequent
change.”42 An agreement should address that the infrastructure management plan is only
temporary and must be adaptable to changing circumstances, like climate change and
sudden population growth. Therefore, agreements should strive for flexible processes and
methods rather than specific one-off decisions.
Additionally, negotiations relating to waste and stormwater infrastructure should
use the mutual gains approach.43 The mutual gains approach focuses on developing

36. See generally Andrew Cherry, Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District Clean Water Act Settlement,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/northeast-ohio-regional-sewer-districtclean-water-act-settlement (last updated May 9, 2017).
37. Stakeholder Engagement, supra note 35.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. Collaborative Adaptive Management, MIT SCI. IMPACT COLLAB.,
https://scienceimpact.mit.edu/collaborative-adaptive-management (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
43. See Lawrence Susskind, Paul F. Levy & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL
AGREEMENTS 17 – 40 (2000).
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relationships and options that meet all stakeholder interests.44 The benefits of a good
relationship are increased engagement “in the value-creating process”, collaboration on
how to create an effective and enforceable agreement, and adaptation to changed
circumstances.45 Local governments must build a long-term relationship with the
Managing Entity because these infrastructure systems can last anywhere from sixty up to
one hundred years and are heavily impacted by changing circumstances.46 The long-term
relationship and trust built through the mutual gains approach should reduce the
likelihood of additional expensive long-term disputes.
The last important factor to a successful negotiation is scenario planning. When
pricing infrastructure improvements or budgeting future operation and maintenance costs,
the parties should consider multiple models depicting various outcomes.47 The parties
should establish survival parameters for the Managing Entity and use a family of
probabilities to figure out the threshold for risk.48 The goal is to price and conduct
infrastructure development and maintenance so the Managing Entity is not losing money
and the ratepayers are not overpaying.49 For example, the city of Barrie in Ontario has
modeled future climate data to inform decisions about how to size a new wastewater
facility.50 Modeling can also help with changes due to population fluctuations in the area,
increasing impervious surface, and other factors that can impact the need for waste and
stormwater infrastructure. By engaging in scenario planning, the parties can better price
the infrastructure which will reduce disputes and save ratepayers and taxpayers money.
IV.

EXAMPLE CASES OF UNSUCCESSFUL AND SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS
A. ALPENA, MICHIGAN: AN EXAMPLE OF WHEN NEGOTIATIONS GO WRONG

The infrastructure dispute in Alpena, Michigan is an example of unsuccessful
negotiations leading to lengthy and expensive litigation. The dispute in Alpena,
44. Susskind, supra note 43, at 17, 25.
45. Id. at 25, 40.
46. See Average Life Expectancy of Select Infrastructure Types and Potential Climate-Related
Vulnerabilities, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/gwsmart-infrastructure-table-life-expectancy.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
47. See Scenario Planning, MIT SCI. IMPACT COLLAB., https://scienceimpact.mit.edu/scenario-planning#
(last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
48. Richard Bradley, London Sch. of Econs., Making Catastrophe Insurance Decisions when the Science is
Uncertain, Talk at the Integrating Science and Values in Climate Risk Management Seminar (Oct. 8, 2020).
49. See id.
50. Michelle Albert, Mike Nanos & Jacque-Ann Grant, Can We Incorporate Climate Change Principles
Into Wastewater Infrastructure Design?, WSP (Apr. 11, 2019).
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Michigan, concerned an agreement where the city charges rates for the township’s use of
its water and sewer system.51 The agreement established a method for calculating the
amount of water and sewage rates the township would have to pay.52 After the agreement
expired in 2012, the city hired a consultant to study what rate adjustments were needed to
maintain and repair the infrastructure.53 The utility consultant found that an additional
$3.6 million a year was needed to meet the city’s infrastructure needs.54
The township responded that the rate change was too high and asked the city for
more options.55 Water rates were later changed from $2.91 per 1,000 gallons to $4.57 per
1,000 gallons, and the sewer rates were changed from $3.48 per 1,000 gallons to $5.17
per 1,000 gallons.56 The average American uses eighty-eight gallons of water per day,
with approximately thirty-three gallons used for sewage, which means the average
monthly water bill for one American would increase from $8.25 to $12.66.57
The township refused to pay the new rates and continued paying the old rates.58
The city retaliated by suing the township in 2014 for not paying the full rate.59 This
resulted in expensive litigation and by February 2019 there was $3.6 million in the
township’s escrow account.60 The township and the city tried resolving their dispute and
discussing other options before the rate hike, and again at a court-ordered mediation in
2017.61 The second attempt to resolve the dispute only lasted a day because city officials
stated that the mediator only had expertise on one method of rate-making, which
drastically limited their options.62

51. Steve Schulwitz, Water-sewer dispute: How did we get here?, THE ALPENA NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Schulwitz, supra note 51.
57. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNDERSTANDING YOUR WATER BILL (last updated Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/watersense/understanding-your-water-bill.
58. Schulwitz, supra note 51.
59. Id.
60. Id. (the township eventually stopped adding money to the escrow account. But until the dispute is
resolved, or the township decides to temporarily pay the full rate the amount due will only increase).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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In 2018, the governing boards of the city and the township voted on a process to
establish rates that would end the dispute.63 The potential methodology would base rates
on factors like water usage, the costs of treatment, and more.64 When returning to
negotiation, the township held a public forum and discussed the case with residents, and
reportedly most residents were pleased with what was discussed.65 However, these
negotiations failed even after the township’s Board of Trustees and the city’s council
voted to ratify the agreement.66 The township’s attorney believed the city had buyer’s
remorse.67 While the city’s witness said the rate methodology was reasonable, the
attorney stated the city seemed disappointed by the results.68
The costs of this dispute and the subsequent litigation have resulted in a loss of
finances, opportunities, and time. The township has spent about $1.16 million on
attorneys, consultants, and other associated costs related to the dispute.69 The city
engineer, Rich Sullenger, stated that more infrastructure projects could have been done if
the township had paid the increased rates.70 Lastly, this dispute has lasted for years and is
ongoing as the township is appealing the case to the Michigan Supreme Court after the
Michigan Court of Appeals denied the township’s motion for reconsideration.71
The Alpena, Michigan case is an example of what happens when the negotiations
go wrong and the parties have to go to litigation. Here, the township engaged in
stakeholder engagement and adaptive management by disseminating information about
the case to its residents and focusing on a methodology to establish rates. However, the
lack of using the mutual gains approach, the strain on their relationship after years of
63. Schulwitz, supra note 51.
64. Steve Schulwitz, Judge orders end to Alpena, Alpena Township dispute, THE ALPENA NEWS (Sept. 19,
2018), https://www.thealpenanews.com/news/local-news/2018/09/judge-orders-end-to-alpena-alpenatownship-dispute/.
65. Steve Schulwitz, ‘A willingness to bend’ Township holds forum on water-sewer dispute, case back in
mediation, THE ALPENA NEWS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.thealpenanews.com/news/localnews/2018/12/a-willingness-to-bend/.
66. Id.; Steve Schulwitz, Still no fix in water, sewer dispute: City, township could ink deal within 30 days,
THE ALPENA NEWS (July 28, 2018), https://www.thealpenanews.com/news/local-news/2018/07/still-no-fixin-water-sewer-dispute/.
67. Schulwitz, supra note 66.
68. Id.
69. Schulwitz, supra note 51.
70. Id.
71. See City of Alpena v. Twp. of Alpena, No. 14-006077-CK, 2020 Mich. App. LEXIS 4296 (Mich. Ct.
App. July 9, 2020); see also Steve Schulwitz, Alpena Township appeals again in water-sewer fight, THE
ALPENA NEWS (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.thealpenanews.com/news/local-news/2020/08/township-okssecret-motion-in-water-sewer-case/.
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litigation, and alleged indifference to proposed solutions early on in the dispute bred
mistrust later on.

B. Cleveland, Ohio: An Example of Negotiating with the EPA as Another Party
and the Loss of Stakeholder Engagement
The Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District (“NEORSD”) serves sixty-two
communities with over one million people and eighty square miles of combined sewers.72
NEORSD, which owns and operates three wastewater treatment plants in Cleveland and
the surrounding area, was discharging nearly five billion gallons of untreated sewage
approximately 3,000 to 4,000 times a year into Lake Erie and nearby rivers.73 This
discharge of sewage violated the Clean Water Act and an estimated three billion dollars
over twenty-five years was needed to become compliant.74 The United States
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) sued the NEORSD for violations of the Clean
Water Act resulting in a federal consent decree mandating these projects.75
NEORSD effectively used unique solutions to fund improvements to its storm and
wastewater infrastructure. To pay for infrastructure improvements, ratepayers must now
pay a stormwater management fee.76 Depending on the amount of impervious area per
residence, the stormwater management fee added an additional $3.09 to $9.27 to
homeowners’ bills per month.77 But, to reduce the strain on lower-income ratepayers,
Homestead and Affordability program participants only pay a fee of $2.07 per month.78
Twenty-five percent of the stormwater management fee goes into a community cost-share

72. United States v. Northeast Ohio Reg’l Sewer Dist., No. 1:10-cv-02895-DCN, 1 (N.D. Ohio filed July 7,
2011), https://www.neorsd.org/I_Library.php?a=download_file&LIBRARY_RECORD_ID=4994.
73. Andrew Cherry, Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District Clean Water Act Settlement, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY (last updated May 9, 2017); What We Do, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST.,
https://www.neorsd.org/about/what-we-do/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
74. CSO Consent Decree, Not Rate Increase, on Dec. 2 Meeting Agenda, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST.,
https://www.neorsd.org/cso-consent-decree-not-rate-increase-on/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
75. See Northeast Ohio Reg’l Sewer Dist., No. 1:10-cv-02895-DCN, 1 (N.D. Ohio filed July 7, 2011).
76. What Will be the Cost Per Quarter for a Typical Homeowner?, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST. (Mar. 26,
2020), https://customerservice.neorsd.org/s/article/What-will-be-the-cost-per-quarter-for-a-typicalhomeowner.
77. Id.
78. Id.; Cost-saving Programs, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST., https://customerservice.neorsd.org/s/costsaving-program (last visited Nov. 5, 2020)(the Homestead program is available for ratepayers over sixtyfive or totally disabled with a household income under $35,000. The Affordability program is for
ratepayers whose income is below 200% of the poverty level).
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program to provide funding for specific stormwater management projects.79 Also,
NEORSD was allowed to run pilot demonstration projects to illustrate the effectiveness
of less energy-intensive treatment options as a way to avoid expensive energy-intensive
treatments.80 This creativity with project management and decision-making has saved
more than $300 million on projects.81 Furthermore, NEORSD has helped build
stakeholder buy-in by implementing affordability programs for ratepayers.82 NEORSD
has utilized stakeholder engagement and adaptive management practices by
implementing affordability programs, the cost-share program, and the pilot programs to
more efficiently meet federal obligations. NEORSD’s main customers are the member
communities it serves, and these programs are helping to keep its constituents happy.
However, there was public pushback against the consent decree. Partly because
the first phase of implementation alone would increase the average ratepayers’ monthly
bill by nineteen dollars.83 People were upset that the negotiations were “confidential” and
that they were not part of the discussion.84 Instead of meeting with ratepayers during the
negotiations, NEORSD waited until after reaching an agreement with federal authorities
to hold public meetings to explain the plan and its impacts on ratepayers.85 But, during
and after the ratification process, NEORSD has disseminated information to ratepayers
through its website about the agreement and its impacts on ratepayers, the environment,
and low-income populations.86 While NEORSD did well in involving the EPA and
member communities as stakeholders, the ratepayers felt dissatisfied with how NEORSD
disseminated information and became frustrated.

79. Community Cost-Share Program, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST.,
https://www.neorsd.org/community/community-cost-share-program/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
80. What’s in the Project Clean Lake CSO Consent Decree?, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST. (Mar. 26,
2020), https://customerservice.neorsd.org/s/article/What-s-in-the-Project-Clean-Lake-CSO-consent-decree.
81. What does this Mean for the Community? For Customers?, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST. (Mar. 26,
2020), https://customerservice.neorsd.org/s/article/What-does-this-mean-for-the-community-Forcustomers.
82. Cost-saving programs, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST., https://customerservice.neorsd.org/s/cost-savingprogram (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
83. Thomas Jewell, Federal Consent Decree to Expected to Nearly Quadruple Cleveland Heights’ 2018
Sewer Bills, CLEVELAND.COM, https://www.cleveland.com/clevelandheights/2017/05/federal_consent_decree_to_expe.html (last updated Jan. 11, 2019).
84. Id.
85. Why are my Sewer Rates Going Up? Public Meetings will Answer, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST.,
https://www.neorsd.org/why-are-my-sewer-rates-going-up-public/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
86. See Trustees OK Improvement plan to Reduce Sewage Discharges, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST.,
https://www.neorsd.org/trustees-ok-improvement-plan-to-reduce/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
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Ultimately, this agreement was an effective and affordable three-billion-dollar
plan using both gray and green infrastructure.87 The agreement also controls forty-six
million gallons of CSOs and captures 98% of the combined sewage going through the
system.88 In comparison, Philadelphia’s two-billion-dollar plan only captures 85% of
combined sewage.89 Overall, NEORSD’s agreement utilizes the mutual gains approach
and focuses on institutionalizing processes and creating innovative solutions. While there
was some stakeholder engagement, the lack of participation by ratepayers in the
negotiation stage has led to ratepayer dissatisfaction.
C. Allentown, Pennsylvania: an example case of rebuilding relationships, using
the mutual gains approach, and incorporating collaborative adaptive
management practices
In 2013, the Lehigh County Authority (“LCA”) entered into an agreement with
Allentown, Pennsylvania. In this $211 million agreement, the LCA leases Allentown’s
water and sewer systems.90 In 2018, the LCA and Allentown got into a dispute due to
unanticipated issues.91 Before this dispute, the two parties had a complicated relationship
with accusations on both sides.92 The LCA estimated that Allentown needed about $150
million in system improvements over the next ten years.93 To pay for improvements,
LCA’s board voted to place Allentown customers on a monthly billing cycle and double

87. Gray infrastructure is infrastructure “designed to move urban stormwater away from the built
environment”, examples include pipes and water treatment systems. Green infrastructure is infrastructure
that mimics natural processes and absorbs or evapotranspirates the water. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
WHAT IS GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE? (last updated Nov. 2, 2020); GREEN: Our Project Clean Lake
Agreement was Groundbreaking, and here are 7 Reasons Why, NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST.,
https://www.neorsd.org/green-our-project-clean-lake-agreemen/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
88. NE. OHIO REG’L SEWER DIST., supra note 87.
89. Id.
90. Emily Opilo, No Proof Allentown Improperly Inflated Suburban Customers’ Sewage Fees, Arbitrator
Rules (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.mcall.com/news/local/allentown/mc-nws-allentown-lca-arbitration20190215-story.html.
91. Andrew Wagaman, Allentown City Council Approves Settlement Deal with Lehigh County Authority
over Water-sewer Lease Disputes, MORNING CALL (Aug. 12, 2020, 7:53 PM),
https://www.mcall.com/news/local/allentown/mc-nws-allentown-council-water-sewer-lease-settlementapproved-20200812-4rmrob5bmvddpjnrozoiwou6iq-story.html.
92. Id.
93. Press Release, Allentown and Lehigh County Authority, City & LCA Reach Tentative Settlement (July
10, 2020) (on file with Lehigh County Authority), https://www.lehighcountyauthority.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/News-Release-City-and-LCA-Reach-Tentative-Settlement-July-10-2020.pdf.
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the fixed water rate for the city’s residential ratepayers to more than $300 annually.94
This increased the amount by 107%, which Allentown argued was in violation of the
agreement.95 Allentown responded by suing the LCA, seeking a preliminary injunction
which was denied.96
Luckily, Allentown and LCA reached an agreement that utilized many of the best
practices discussed in the previous section. The agreement engages stakeholders, focuses
on collaborative adaptive management, utilizes the mutual gains approach, and uses
scenario planning.97 To engage the stakeholders, the settlement had to be approved by
the Allentown City Council, the LCA Board of Directors, and the LCA bondholders.98
The city council’s meetings were livestreamed and public participation in LCA meetings
was virtual due to the pandemic.99 The LCA also made presentations to the board public
on its website and included figures and sample problems to explain the terms of the
agreement.100 Additionally, the agreement focused on collaborative adaptive management
by institutionalizing processes and creating opportunities for evaluation and change.
Furthermore, the settlement has a long-term component by providing for minimum
annual pipeline replacement, calculation of Capital Cost Recovery Charge, rate
adjustments, and capital improvement funding.101
The agreement also utilized the mutual gains approach. Mayor Ray O’Connell
stated, “[b]oth sides have moved substantially from their original positions. The
settlement is in the combined best interests of the city, LCA and our ratepayers.”102
Under the agreement, the LCA will pay actual water production costs and a proportional
share for the capital improvements at the water treatment plant.103 This payment structure
lowers the costs of these projects to Allentown residents and the LCA benefits from

94. Wagaman, supra note 91.
95. Allentown v. Lehigh Cty. Auth., 222 A.3d 1152, 1155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019).
96. Id. at 1155-56.
97. See generally, Allentown and Lehigh County, supra note 95.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Lehigh County Authority & City of Allentown, Remarks at LCA Board of Directors Meeting
(July 20, 2020) (powerpoint available in Lehigh County Authority’s website),
https://www.lehighcountyauthority.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LCA-City-Settlement-DetailedReview-072020.pdf.
101. See id.
102. Allentown and Lehigh County, supra note 95.
103. Id.
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increased city revenues.104 Rates for Allentown residents will increase about eighty-eight
dollars per year for most customers, and by 2024 the full rate increase will be $176 plus
inflation – an amount far less than the originally proposed $300 increase.105
Additionally, if Allentown meets key benchmarks, the LCA will provide “rate
relief” by freezing or reducing rates to city customers.106 Examples of key benchmarks
include meeting bondholder requirements and achieving adequate reserves for future
system improvements.107 The LCA will also help Allentown administer the lease by
contributing $400,000 annually.108 In addition, the agreement lowers the “rate of return”
from the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s allowable capital cost recovery
charge109 of 9.75% to 5.45% for all future projects.110 Although this change in the
allowable recovery charge increases the LCA’s risk by lowering its rate of return on
infrastructure improvements, it lowers the impact on ratepayers. Additionally, the
agreement reduces the amount of required yearly water main replacements and, instead,
focuses on increasing leak detection.111 All of these tradeoffs protect the LCA and its
bondholders’ investment by providing benchmarks while helping the city keep water and
sewer rates down.112 Moreover, the agreement used scenario planning by using charts to
model the impacts of rates on customers.113 The agreement reached between Allentown
and the LCA utilized stakeholder engagement, focused on collaborative adaptive
management, used the mutual gains approach, and conducted some scenario planning.
Although the agreement had many successful aspects, the agreement did not consider
extreme weather events in its scenario planning.

104. Allentown and Lehigh County, supra note 95.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. “A ‘Capital Cost Recovery Charge’ is a reimbursement and consists of: (i) the amount of principal and
debt incurred to finance the Major Capital Improvement; and (ii) the return on equity contributed to pay
capital costs associated with the Major Capital Improvement, equal to a standardized return.” Middletown
Water Joint Venture v. Middletown, No. 1:19-CV-1402, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63860 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13,
2020).
110. Allentown and Lehigh County, supra note 95.
111. Lehigh County Authority & City of Allentown, Remarks at LCA Board of Directors Meeting (July 20,
2020) (powerpoint available in Lehigh County Authority’s website).
112. Id.
113. See Lehigh County Authority & City of Allentown, supra note 111.
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V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, COVID is currently deteriorating the storm and wastewater system
and in the future, extreme weather events are likely to as well.114 Since storm and
wastewater system improvements and maintenance are expensive and are paid mainly by
local governments, disputes are likely to occur if a process is not put in place. Litigation
can be expensive and take years, with those expenses being transferred to the ratepayers
and taxpayers. Therefore, local governments must handle negotiations carefully and
maintain their relationship with the Managing Entity to prevent costly disputes that could
end in litigation.
The key factors to a successful negotiation are engaging stakeholders,
participating in collaborative adaptive management, focusing on mutual gains, and
conducting scenario planning.115 Local governments must keep their constituencies
informed and, if possible, include them in the negotiation process. The agreement must
institutionalize processes of evaluation and adaptation that focus on how rates should be
calculated, how and when to replace infrastructure, and how disputes should be resolved.
If the agreement includes those terms, the parties are less likely of having to repeat this
process. Relationship building and maintenance should be the key focus of the parties due
to the long life of infrastructure and how frequently system needs can change. Lastly,
scenario planning is critical but is rarely done effectively since it can be hard to translate
models into solutions.116 Overall, storm and wastewater infrastructure is an investment
with lots of risks, usually passed onto ratepayers through higher rates. Therefore – like
the insurance industry – any agreement needs to balance risks to guarantee a return on
investment while not overcharging the ratepayers.117 As extreme weather events increase
and the COVID pandemic continues, local governments must use these strategies to
lower the impact of increasing infrastructure costs on their constituents.

114. See NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ASK THE SCIENTIST: EXTREME RAINFALL, WHY IT
HAPPENS AND HOW WE PREDICT IT (2018).
115. Tools, MIT SCI. IMPACT COLLAB. (last visited Oct. 25, 2020); Lawrence Susskind, Paul F. Levy &
Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 36 – 40 (2000).
116. Scenario Planning, MIT SCI. IMPACT COLLAB. (last visited Oct. 25, 2020).
117. See Richard Bradley, London Sch. of Econs., Making Catastrophe Insurance Decisions when the
Science is Uncertain, Talk at the Integrating Science and Values in Climate Risk Management Seminar
(Oct. 8, 2020).
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